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Love Your Husband – But Don’t Lend Him Money 
Roger Bernhardt 
 
If one takes the court’s recitation of facts in Marriage of Lange (2002) 102 CA4th 360, 125 
CR2d 379, reported in this issue, at face value, there are puzzles everywhere. Basically, it 
appears that Sandra contributed her separate funds for the acquisition, mortgage reduction, and 
improvement of their joint tenancy house, as well as to cover some family living expenses. She 
obtained from husband Heino a note secured by a deed of trust on the (same) house to cover 
some part of her contributions, but the court of appeal held that those documents were 
unenforceable because they gave Sandra an unfair advantage over Heino, which triggered a 
presumption of undue influence, which she never rebutted. As a real estate attorney, rather than a 
matrimonial attorney, I would not have predicted that result, and it means that attorneys should 
watch out how they advise their clients in interspousal matters. 
Unfair Advantage? 
The court held that the note gave Sandra an advantage because it had a fixed principal and 
earned interest; the deed of trust gave her a further advantage because it made her a secured 
creditor. These features were held to be advantages because, under Fam C §2640, Sandra’s 
statutory rights of reimbursement would not have included some of the items she paid for 
(notably the family living expenses), would not have borne interest, and would have been limited 
by the value of the property; the note included none of those limitations. The deed of trust gave 
her an additional advantage because her status under the Family Code would have been that of an 
unsecured creditor. 
The loan documents certainly did make Sandra better off than she would be under the Family 
Code, but I wonder whether that is the proper test for deciding whether a transaction results in an 
advantage to one spouse over the other. Had Sandra agreed to lend Heino $250,000 of her 
separate funds, I would not think that taking a note and deed of trust from him for the loan gave 
her an unfair advantage over him. In fact, I would not think the documents gave her any 
advantage at all, so long as the loan funds were actually given and the loan terms were not 
predatory. When the debtor gets the creditor’s money and the creditor gets the debtor’s note, who 
gets the advantage? 
The same appears to be the case when Sandra agrees to put $250,000 of her separate funds 
into the community pot to cover various expenses. If she didn’t have to put up the money in the 
first place, and if she actually did put up the money, how does taking a note for it constitute an 
unfair advantage to her? The difference between these two scenarios is that the money in the first 
case went to the husband and in the second case went to the community, where the Family Code 
adds certain reimbursement rights for the community contributions. The fact that Sandra would 
not independently be entitled to statutory reimbursement for loans to her husband certainly 
makes it all the more appropriate that she take a note, if she wants to ensure that the transaction 
is treated as a loan rather than a gift. But how does the right of statutory reimbursement in the 
other case make a note less legitimate? 
What the court did was to compare Sandra’s reimbursement rights under the Family Code 
against her repayment rights under the loan documents, whereas I would compare her repayment 
rights against the consideration she furnished. Most lenders ask for notes and/or deeds of trust 
because they don’t like the remedies the system furnishes them as undocumented, unsecured 
creditors; but, if the court, as a prerequisite to enforcing these documents on loans that were 
actually made, requires that the lender be no better off than if she had no note or deed of trust, we 
all better watch out how generous we are in the future. 
If that is now to be the standard in interspousal transactions, there is probably not much to be 
done on behalf of clients who wish to treat their spouses generously but not foolishly. Since any 
improvement over statutory reimbursement rights may constitute a suspect advantage, better 
drafting of documents to provide better remedies is almost self-defeating: Since statutory 
reimbursement is interest-free, any documentary provision for interest gives the lending spouse 
more than the statute and may ipso facto constitute an improper advantage. A fixed principal sum 
that is not contingent on the property’s ultimate value, or that includes any amounts advanced for 
mortgage interest, maintenance, insurance, or tax payments, will also render the note 
unenforceable, since all these items are specifically excluded from §2640 reimbursement. The 
deed of trust is probably per se invalid for providing some security to the lending spouse. 
Advantages may beset the contributor on all sides. 
Rebutting the Presumption of  
Undue Influence 
The advantage that was perceived to benefit Sandra triggered the presumption, under Fam C 
§721, that she had employed undue influence over Heino in getting him to sign the loan papers. 
Even though the trial court found that the documents were otherwise valid and had not been 
executed under duress, that presumption rendered them unenforceable.  
That means that, on remand, Sandra must rebut the presumption of undue influence. We will 
have to wait for the remand to see how she (and her attorney) manage that task, but the question 
for other attorneys is how to ensure that the transactions their clients engage in survive this 
heightened scrutiny. 
The conventional approach is to make sure that the other spouse has an attorney advising him 
and approving the deal. See Estate of Shinkle (2002) 97 CA4th 990, 119 CR2d 42. Indeed, the 
legislature came pretty close to mandating that approach last year when it made support waivers 
in premarital agreements unenforceable unless the waiving party was represented by independent 
counsel. See Fam C §§1612(c), 1615(c). I don’t think the wording of those statutes necessarily 
implies that people like Sandra must demand that people like Heino seek counsel before signing 
notes, but there are enough obvious similarities between the two situations to make such a 
prediction plausible.  
The intriguing question for me is: How should Heino’s lawyer have advised him when he 
reported that Sandra would not contribute any more funds unless he signed a mortgage? Since 
the entire body of mortgage law is based on the notion that debtors need the protection of a court 
of equity precisely because they lack the power to protect themselves from overreaching 
creditors, what role is the debtor’s lawyer supposed to play, other than to witness the slaughter? 
(My mortgage casebook has, as its inscription, the statement of Lord Chancellor Northington: 
“For necessitous men are not, truly speaking, free men, but to answer a present exigency, will 
submit to any terms that the craft may impose upon them”—which certainly tells you what 
judges think of mortgage lending.) If Heino’s attorney merely tells him that a mortgage may 
mean foreclosure, but is unable to successfully bargain for different or better terms, has Heino 
really been effectively represented so as not to be unduly influenced? 
The strategy of independent counsel also does no good in those cases where the mortgage has 
already been signed and the parties are in court fighting over it. Assuming that any unreviewed 
note and mortgage between spouses can ever be upheld, the advantaged spouse is going to have 
to show that there was a full and fair disclosure of everything that was important to the 
disadvantaged spouse to get around the undue influence presumption. See Marsiglia v Marsiglia 
(1947) 78 CA2d 701, 178 P2d 478. Of course, it would be wonderful if the disadvantaged spouse 
testified that he knew exactly what he was doing when he signed, but far more likely is testimony 
such as Heino gave here—that he mistakenly thought the documents meant something different 
from what they said—which was designed to support rather than refute the presumption. 
Rebuttal testimony from the advantaged spouse that everything really was explained and 
understood will have to be corroborated to be believed, but are there likely to be witnesses to 
these conversations? Moreover, there may be, at best, some sort of indirect collateral evidence, 
e.g., proof that the marriage had already broken down or that she already had good reason not to 
trust him because of his handling of other financial matters; but will even that suffice? In any 
event, it seems certain that outcomes will be unpredictable and litigation costs will be high.  
Really Joint Tenancy? 
One issue not discussed in Marriage of Lange is the status of the property itself. The deed of 
trust was on the family residence, which the spouses held in joint tenancy. If it really was a joint 
tenancy, then Heino’s signature on the document was sufficient to encumber his interest in the 
property, enabling that interest to be foreclosed on separately. Thus, if Sandra were the 
successful bidder at her own foreclosure sale (outsiders would be unlikely to bid for the right to 
become a co-owner of a house along with her), she could gain title to the entire house and 
thereby keep it away from a divorce court’s power to divide it up.  
However, referring to the house as joint tenancy property ignores Fam C §2581, which 
provides that all property acquired during marriage in joint form is presumed to be community 
property, unless there is additional documentation showing that it isn’t (and nothing of that sort 
was mentioned here). The presumption of §2581 applies only “[for] the purpose of division of 
property on dissolution of marriage”; in this case, dissolution actions had been filed by both 
spouses shortly before Sandra filed her judicial foreclosure action, so the property was already 
under family court jurisdiction; furthermore, the foreclosure and dissolution actions had been 
consolidated. 
If the house is recharacterized as community property, what happens to Heino’s deed of trust? 
Family Code §1102 generally requires the signatures of both spouses to be affixed to any 
document affecting title to community property. The statute does make an exception for 
transactions between spouses, and specifically mentions mortgages, but leaves unstated what it 
means for a husband to mortgage his interest in community property to his wife. I guess it means 
that “his” half may still be awarded to him in the dissolution but that she can foreclose on it. I 
assume she gets the same rights and powers that his attorney would get if the attorney took a 
mortgage to secure his or her legal fees in the divorce. See Fam C §1102(e). The effect on 
outsiders may be more problematic, since her mortgage claim will have to be ranked against the 
claims of creditors against the community, against her, and against him.  
Had this couple come to me to discuss their future, I would have been tempted to advise them 
to stick together. The legal costs necessary to untangle this property law/mortgage law/family 
law mess should be a strong argument in favor of California’s policy encouraging marriages to 
endure.  
Postscript: Vice Versa? 
In Bono v Clark (2002) 103 CA4th 1409, 128 CR2d 31, reported at p , the Sixth District joins 
the Second and Third in concluding that spending community funds on separate property gives 
the community a pro tanto interest in the property if it has appreciated, and a right to 
reimbursement if it has not. See my column Characterizing Separate or Community 
Expenditures on Community or Separate Assets, 25 CEB RPLR 98 (Apr. 2002). That makes me 
wonder what would happen if the spouse who did not own the separate property wanted better 
protection than that rule gave her? Is the rule merely a default rule, to be applied only when no 
other arrangement was made, or is it the fair rule, any revision of which gives her an unfair 
advantage? If the wife wants her husband to give her a deed of trust on his separate house as a 
condition for consenting to the expenditure of community funds on it, does she have to make 
sure he sees a lawyer first? Is the same true if she wants the beneficiary of the deed to be the 
community rather than she herself, or if the note is for only half the community money 
expended? If they do see a lawyer, I hope it isn’t me.  
